Macroeconomic effects of consumer debt: three theoretical essays by Allain, Olivier
Macroeconomic effects of consumer debt: three
theoretical essays
Olivier Allain
To cite this version:
Olivier Allain. Macroeconomic effects of consumer debt: three theoretical essays. Documents
de travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2014.87 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2014. <halshs-
01147612>
HAL Id: halshs-01147612
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01147612
Submitted on 30 Apr 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 Documents de Travail du 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macroeconomic effects of consumer debt: 
three theoretical essays 
 
Olivier ALLAIN 
 
2014.87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13 
http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/ 
ISSN : 1955-611X 
 1 
Macroeconomic effects of consumer debt: 
three theoretical essays  
 
Olivier Allain1 
 
 
 
Abstract. Post-Keynesian economists have quite recently begun to draw attention to the 
consumer debt. However, as they omit the principal payment, they implicitly assimilate this 
debt as perpetual loans. The goal of this article is mainly methodological. We first develop a 
‘Keynesian’ overlapping generations framework assuming that people borrow when they are 
young and service their debt (interests and principal) in the following periods. Defaults on the 
principal are also taken into account. We then analyze the theoretical properties of the 
equilibriums (multiplier effect, stability conditions) resulting from the introduction of this 
framework in three types of models that differ in regard of who are the debtors and who are 
the creditors: workers can borrow from capitalists (essay 1) or from their peer (essay 2); 
capitalists can borrow from their peer (essay 3). 
 
Key words: Consumer debt, Keynesian models, Equilibrium instability, Overlapping 
generations models. 
JEL codes: E12, E2, E21 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Post-Keynesian economists have quite recently begun to draw attention to the consumer debt. 
Their analyses put the stress on the causes of the surge in consumer debt ratio as well as on its 
economic consequences. About the first issue, the supply-side factors, mainly the financial 
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deregulation and increased competition between ﬁnancial institutions, appear to have played a 
leading role. However, many authors point the role of the demand-side factors: the evolution 
of social norms and consumers’ needs (Cynamon and Fazzari, 2008, 2013), the conspicuous 
consumption and Veblen’s effect in a context of growing inequalities (Barba and Pivetti, 
2009; Palley, 2010; Wisman, 2013; Kappeler and Schütz, 2014; Kim et al., 2014a, 2014b), or 
a wealth effect resting on notional wealth (Bhaduri et al., 2006; Bhaduri, 2011). 
About the consequences of this phenomenon, several authors have explored the properties of 
the equilibrium resulting from the introduction of consumer debt in a demand-led framework. 
In such framework, the level of economic activity partly rests upon the propensity to 
consume. Actually, it is commonly admitted that consumer lending involves a rise in the 
propensity to consume for the concerned households. However, the payment of interests 
induces an income distribution from high-consumption agents (the debtors) to low-
consumption agents (the creditors), therefore the uncertainty of the final impact of borrowing 
on the overall propensity to consume and, consequently, on the level of economic activity and 
growth (Palley, 1994, 2002; Dutt, 2006; Hein, 2012; Charpe and Flaschel, 2013). 
Another macroeconomic consequence relates to the consumer debt (un)sustainability and the 
(in)stability of the equilibrium. First, the debt accumulation might be uncontrolled. According 
to Barba and Pivetti (2009) who make a parallel with the snowball effect of the sovereign 
debt, this happens if the rate of interest is higher than the rate of growth of the household 
income. However, unlike for governments, the payment of interests may act as a discipline 
device on consumption, thus preventing the consumer debt explosion, a point which has been 
clarified by Dutt (2006) or Charpe and Flaschel (2013) among other. Charpe and Flaschel 
(2013, p.55) suggest another destabilizing mechanism based on a positive loop between 
consumption and the banks’ credit supply: more consumption implies better performance for 
banks which supply more credit and support consumption, etc. 
Second, the surge in consumer debt may involve a rise in default rates, therefore more 
financial fragility and a rise in systemic risk (Cynamon and Fazzary, 2008, 2013). In 
particular, banks may react by credit rationing, which can generate the vicious circle at work 
during ﬁnancial crises: the tightening of credit, the deterioration of economic activities and 
the accumulation of non-performing loans in the creditors’ balance sheets (Palley, 1994; 
Charpe and Flaschel, 2013). 
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From a methodological point of view, the theoretical models available in the exiting literature 
may be sorted in three classes according who are the debtors and who are the creditors in the 
system. This is a core question since the macroeconomic effects of debt depend on who 
spends, who saves and how borrowing and debt servicing affect the income distribution and 
then the overall propensity to consume. In most models including for instance Dutt (2006), 
Hein (2012), and Charpe and Flaschel (2013), workers are supposed to borrow from 
capitalists. For their part, Kim et al. (2014a) assume that workers partly borrow from their 
peer. Eventually, capitalists can borrow from capitalists, as in Bhaduri et al. (2006) in which 
the households’ debt refers to a wealth effect. 
The starting point of this article is the observation that, while all these models include the 
payment of interests as a constraint on consumption, they omit the payment of the principal. 
Such omission may be relevant for a sovereign debt: Treasury can take out a new loan to 
repay the old one, a process which assimilates public bonds to perpetual loans. But a 
household has a finite life expectancy. He can’t transform his liabilities into a perpetual debt; 
he must repay the principal one time or another; or, if he can’t, he makes default. 
The theoretical challenge is to take into account the household finite life expectancy in a 
macroeconomic model in which “households” taken as an aggregate have an indefinite life 
expectancy. This difficulty can be resolved through a ‘Keynesian’ overlapping generations 
framework, assuming that people borrow when they are young and service their debt in the 
following periods. The default possibility can also be introduced. 
As a result, everybody commits to service his debt, interest and principal. The increase of the 
propensity to consume (at the time of the debt issuing) is then followed by several periods 
during which the household must reduce his consumption. This means firstly that a household 
cannot enter into perpetual debt, and secondly that the net global effect of debt on the 
propensity to consume is a priori undetermined. 
This framework is labelled ‘Keynesian’ because, contrary to the orthodox approach, it neither 
depends upon the hypothesis that economic agents predict future states of the world, nor upon 
that of intertemporal utility maximization. The only assumptions are that households borrow 
as they are young (whatever the reason: impatience, conspicuous consumption, etc.) but have 
to service their debt afterwards. 
This Keynesian overlapping generations framework is then successively introduced in each of 
the three classes of models according to who are the debtors and who are the creditors. Note 
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that the aim of the present article is mainly methodological: it is to focus on the theoretical 
properties of the equilibriums resulting from this innovation.  
Because of this methodological goal, the other hypotheses included in the models will remain 
quite unsophisticated: the explanations of the borrowing behavior are leaved aside so that the 
‘propensity to borrow’ is assumed to be exogenously given, the rate of accumulation is also 
assumed to be given, etc. As a result, some of the models properties will appear to be 
counterintuitive or at odds with empirical facts. The interest of these counterintuitive 
properties is to underscore the lacking hypotheses which should be introduced in the 
modelling. For example, we will show that, under reasonable assumptions, a rise in consumer 
debt isn’t destabilizing by itself, therefore the conclusion that an hypothesis must be changed 
in order to generate some instability (the propensity to borrow must be made endogenous). 
Another example: as debt defaults have by themselves a positive impact on economic activity, 
specific assumptions (such as the degradation in the state of confidence) must be added in 
order to account for financial fragility. 
Section 2 is devoted to the model in which workers borrowing is financed by capitalists 
(essay 1). In section 3, it is assumed that workers partly borrow from their peer (essay 2). In 
section 4, capitalists finance themselves (essay 3). The main results are summarized in the 
concluding section. 
For sake of place and simplicity, it isn’t possible to deal with each essay in depth. The aim is 
rather to emphasize the converging outcomes resulting from the introduction of principal 
payment in an overlapping generations framework.  
2. Essay 1: Capitalists finance the workers’ debt 
2.1. Model structure and stock-flow consistency 
We suppose an economy with four agents: workers, capitalists, banks and firms. The ex post 
accounting are reported in Table 1 (Balance-sheet matrix) and Table 2 (Transactions flow 
matrix).
2
 
[Table 1 around here] 
[Table 2 around here] 
                                                 
2
 Symbols with plus signs describe sources of funds whereas negative signs indicate uses of funds. 
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In accordance with the overlapping generations hypothesis, it is assumed that young workers 
borrow because their consumption (𝐶𝑦𝑤) is higher than their wage (𝑊𝑦). Their new loans (𝑁𝐿) 
are then: 
𝑁𝐿 = 𝐶𝑦𝑤 − 𝑊𝑦 (1) 
In addition of the interests on their loans (𝑖𝑙𝐿 where 𝑖𝑙 is the rate of interest on loans and 𝐿 the 
amount of loans), the older workers have to pay a part of the principal to the banks: the 
principal payment (𝑃𝑃) which is preceded by a negative sign indicating that it is a use of 
funds for these workers. The 𝜆𝑝 parameter is a binary parameter (the 𝑝 subscript standing for 
principal) whose value is 1 if this payment is taken into account in the analysis and 0 if it is 
omitted. 
When 𝜆𝑝 = 1, workers can default (see also Charpe and Flaschel, 2013). For convenience, 
default is not specified as a fraction of loans but as the fraction 𝜃 of workers’ principal 
payment. The idea is that older workers make default when they aren’t able to pay back this 
principal. Default is supposed to be definitive without any rescheduling opportunity. The 
effective amount of principal payment is then (1 − 𝜃)𝜆𝑝𝑃𝑃 which is assumed to be the only 
worker’s saving (workers don’t make any deposit): 
(1 − 𝜃)𝜆𝑝𝑃𝑃 = 𝑊𝑜 − 𝐶𝑜𝑤 − 𝑖𝑙𝐿 (2) 
where 𝑊𝑜 and 𝐶𝑜𝑤 represent the wage and consumption of older workers. Eventually, the 
variation of loans corresponds to the new loans minus the effective principal payment minus 
default, that is: 
?̇? = 𝑁𝐿 − (1 − 𝜃)𝜆𝑝𝑃𝑃 − 𝜃𝜆𝑝𝑃𝑃 (3) 
Of course, 𝜆𝑝 = 0 means that workers never pay back the principal so that they have 
contracted a perpetual debt. 
It is important to underline that defaults don’t directly affect the variation of loans (?̇?). Indeed, 
assuming 𝜆𝑝 = 1, two cases must be distinguished: either older workers pay 𝑃𝑃 to their 
creditors so the debt diminishes by 𝑃𝑃; or they make a default of 𝜃𝑃𝑃, pay (1 − 𝜃)𝑃𝑃 so that 
debt diminishes by 𝑃𝑃 once again. 
However default negatively affects banks profitability: 
𝐹𝑏 = 𝑖𝑙𝐿 − 𝑖𝑚𝑀 − 𝜃𝜆𝑝𝑃𝑃 (4) 
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where 𝑖𝑚 is the rate of interest on deposits and 𝑀 the amount of deposits. We assume that 
banks belong to capitalists who get the whole (𝐹𝑏) as dividends.
3
 The banks and capitalists 
accountings can then be merged together, hence a simplification of the model specification. 
Another simplification will be introduced as we assume that 𝑖𝑚 = 0. 
The capitalists financing capacity is the difference between their income (composed by banks 
𝐹𝑏 and firms 𝐹𝑓 dividends) and their consumption spending (𝐶𝑐). This capacity is used to buy 
firms equities (?̇?) and to increase their deposits (?̇?) so that: 
𝐹𝑓 + (𝑖𝑙𝐿 − 𝑖𝑚𝑀 − 𝜃𝜆𝑝𝑃𝑃) − 𝐶𝑐 = ?̇? + ?̇? (5) 
As it clearly appears in Table 2, the variation of deposits finances (via the banks) the variation 
of loans (?̇? = ?̇?). 
The firms’ accounts are very simple. Firms produce consumption (𝐶) and capital (𝐼) goods. 
Note that 𝐼 stands for gross investment which includes capital depreciation (𝛿𝐾). This 
depreciation is financed by a fraction of profits, the remaining part being distributed through 
dividends 𝐹𝑓. Eventually, equity issues finance the net investment. 
2.2. Workers’ consumption: a Keynesian overlapping generations framework 
We built a model with 𝑉 generations and no demographic growth so that 1 𝑉⁄  is the weight of 
each generation. In period 𝑡, all workers are supposed to have the same productivity, 
regardless of how their age. Noting 𝑊𝑡 the global wage bill, each vintage receives 𝑊𝑡 𝑉⁄ . 
According to the overlapping generations model, it is assumed that workers borrow when they 
are young (whatever the reason) and service their debt in the following periods. The 
consumption behavior thus evolves over time for each generation. Suppose that young 
workers of vintage 𝜐 enter the labor market at time 𝑡 and consume more than their wages in 
that period: 
𝐶𝜐,𝑡 = (1 + 𝑐𝑦𝑤)
𝑊𝑡
𝑉
 (6) 
where 𝑐𝑦𝑤 stands for the young workers’ ‘propensity to borrow’. This propensity is assumed 
to be exogenous, as in Dutt (2006) who specifies that the “desired level of borrowing (…) can 
be interpreted as being determined by lenders, by borrowers or by both” (p.347). But the 
function can of course be made more explicit. For instance, the propensity to borrow is 
                                                 
3
 On the contrary, Charpe and Flaschel (2013) assume that banks retain a fraction of their income. 
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endogenous in Charpe and Flaschel (2013) where it depends on bank performances. In Hein 
(2012), workers’ borrowing rests on the amount of saving that rentiers decide to lend. Other 
authors introduce income inequalities (Barba and Pivetti, 2009) or consumption inequalities 
(Setterfield and Kim, 2013) to take the relative income hypothesis into account. In other 
words, there is a wide variety of specifications. We keep the simplest hypothesis of an 
exogenous propensity to borrow in order to focus on the consequences of the principal 
payment whatever the motivation of debt. 
The debt for vintage 𝜐 is: 
𝐿𝜐,𝑡 = 𝑁𝐿𝑡 = 𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑊𝑡
𝑉
 (7) 
The principal payment is assumed to be uniform in every period until the end of the life span 
of the generation and the fulfillment of the intertemporal budget constraint: 
𝑃𝑃𝜐,𝑡+𝑛 =
𝐿𝑣,𝑡
𝑉−1
          (𝑛 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑉 − 1) (8) 
The remaining debt for the vintage 𝜐 at time 𝑡 + 𝑛 is then: 
𝐿𝜐,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝐿𝜐,𝑡+𝑛−1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑣,𝑡+𝑛          (𝑛 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑉 − 1) (9) 
As workers don’t borrow anymore after their first period and as they save no more than their 
principal payment, the consumption behavior for the next periods (𝑡 + 𝑛) is given by: 
𝐶𝜐,𝑡+𝑛 =
𝑊𝑡+𝑛
𝑉
− (1 − 𝜃)𝑃𝑃𝜐,𝑡+𝑛 − 𝑖𝑙𝐿𝜐,𝑡+𝑛−1          (𝑛 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑉 − 1) (10) 
where, contrary to the assumption made by Charpe and Flaschel (2013), the direct effect of 
defaults (𝜃𝑃𝑃) on workers’ consumption is positive:4 while the principal payment reduces the 
possibility to consume, any default on this payment restores this possibility.
5
 
We now consider the aggregation of the 𝑉 workers vintage which are present at time 𝑡, each 
of which having borrowed: 
𝐿𝜐,𝑡−𝜐 =
𝑐𝑦𝑤𝑊𝑡−𝜐
𝑉
          (𝜐 = 0, ⋯ , 𝑉 − 1) (11) 
                                                 
4
 There may be a negative indirect effect via a credit rationing or a rise in the rate of interest. We 
will discuss this points later. 
5
 An implicit assumption is that (at a microeconomic level, represented by small case letters) every 
defaulting worker get a higher income (𝑤 − 𝑖𝑙𝑙) than his principal payment (𝑝𝑝). Otherwise, if 
𝑤 − 𝑖𝑙𝑙 < 𝑝𝑝, the possibility to consume preserved by the default is only restricted to the income (that 
is, 𝑐 = 𝑤 − 𝑖𝑙𝑙 < 𝑝𝑝). The remaining part of the default (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤 + 𝑖𝑙𝑙) doesn’t enable any 
consumption. However, this microeconomic feature is left aside because of the difficulty to take it into 
account in a macroeconomic model. 
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Except for the youth, each vintage has to pay: 
𝑃𝑃𝜐,𝑡 =
𝐿𝜐,𝑡−𝜐
𝑉−1
          (𝜐 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑉 − 1) (12) 
The aggregate amount of principal payment at time t is then: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝜐,𝑡
𝑉−1
𝜐=1 =
𝑐𝑦𝑤Ω𝑊𝑡
𝑉
 (13) 
with: 
Ω =
1
𝑔(𝑉−1)
[1 − (1 + 𝑔)1−𝑉] (14) 
where 𝑔 denotes the growth rate of the wage bill.6 It can be shown that Ω decreases as 𝑉 
and/or 𝑔 increases. More precisely: 𝑔 > 0 implies that 0 < Ω < 1; 𝑔 → 0 implies that Ω → 1; 
and, 𝑔 < 0 implies that Ω > 1.  
Finally, the aggregate consumption for the 𝑉 workers vintage at time 𝑡 is: 
𝐶𝑤𝑡 = (1 +
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
) 𝑊𝑡 − (1 − 𝜃)𝑃𝑃𝑡 − 𝑖𝑙𝐿𝑡−1 (15) 
Substituting 𝑃𝑃𝑡, adopting continuous time and rearranging in order to offer greater 
generality, this function can be rewritten: 
𝐶𝑤 = {1 + [1 − (1 − 𝜃)𝜆𝑝Ω]
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
} 𝑊 − 𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑙𝐿 (16) 
where the term in braces represents the propensity to consume out of wages (the level of loans 
being given). The parameter 𝜆𝑝 is introduced here in order to distinguish the overlapping 
generations model where the principal payment is included (𝜆𝑝 = 1) with others models 
where this payment is omitted (that is, 𝜆𝑝 = 0). In the latter case, it will be assumed to that 
𝜃 = 0 for the sake that workers can’t default on the principal of their debt if they have no 
principal to pay to their creditors. 
Another parameter, 𝜆𝑖 ∈ [0,1] (the 𝑖 subscript standing for interests) is added in order to take 
into account the impact of the payment of interests on consumption. Note that 𝜆𝑝 = 𝜆𝑖 = 1 
are the only conditions for the intertemporal budget constraint to be satisfied and the model to 
remain consistent as an overlapping generations model. In that case, debt servicing plays as a 
perfect discipline device on the consumption behavior. This is our reference model.  
                                                 
6
 Because there is no demographic growth, 𝑔 is the rate of growth of individual wages as well as of 
the wage bill. As it will be made explicit below, the increase in the wage bill results from the increase 
in the capital stock which involves a rise in labor productivity.  
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This reference model will be compared to a model where the debt servicing doesn’t act as a 
perfect discipline device on consumption, that is 𝜆𝑝 = 0 and/or 𝜆𝑖 < 1.
7
 Such hypotheses are 
inconsistent in an overlapping generations model, but they can be made consistent in a model 
with no generation and perpetual debt.  
Note that the two hypotheses, 𝜆𝑝 = 0 and 𝜆𝑖 < 1, have different implications on the workers 
behavior: 𝜆𝑖 < 1 implies new borrowing for workers to pay their interests whereas 𝜆𝑝 = 0 
doesn’t imply new borrowing (it just means that workers don’t pay their principal, or that the 
model omits this payment). 
Finally, the variation of loans is given by: 
?̇? = 𝐶𝑦𝑤 − 𝑊𝑦 − 𝜆𝑝𝑃𝑃 + (1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝑖𝑙𝐿 (17) 
After substituting, it comes that: 
?̇? = (1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝑖𝑙𝐿 + (1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
𝑊 (18) 
which is a positive function of 𝑖𝑙, 𝐿, 𝛾 (via a decrease in Ω), 𝑐𝑦𝑤 and 𝑊, while it is a negative 
function of 𝜆𝑖, 𝜆𝑝 and 𝑉. The introduction of the principal payment parameter (𝜆𝑝 = 1) then 
entails conflicting changes in consumption: a negative direct effect on the propensity to 
consume but a positive indirect effect via the reduction in the amount of loans and then the 
payment of interests. In the same way, an increase in 𝜆𝑖 has a negative direct effect on 
consumption (which is more disciplined by the payments of interests) but a positive indirect 
effect via the reduction of the amount of loans. 
2.3. Equilibrium and dynamics analyses 
The behavior of the other agents must be specified to complete the model. First, a very simple 
investment function is retained in order to keep the focus on household debt, independently of 
the vivid debate on the investment specification amongst the different Post-Keynesians 
approaches. It is thus assumed that investment maintains the growth of the capital stock (𝐾) at 
an exogenous, positive rate (𝛾 > 0). However, as it is interesting to occasionally highlight the 
                                                 
7
 Although the models in the existing literature generally assume that 𝜆𝑖 = 1, it will be instructive 
to look at the consequences of the assumption 𝜆𝑖 = 0 on the model properties. 
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models properties under the assumption of a zero (or even negative) 𝛾, capital depreciation 
(𝛿) is also introduced in the model.8 We then have: 
𝐼 = (𝛾 + 𝛿)𝐾 (19) 
Second, capitalist are supposed to spend the propensity 𝑐𝑐 of their net income in consumption, 
that is:
9
 
𝐶𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐(𝐹𝑓 − 𝛿𝐾 + 𝑖𝑙𝐿 − 𝜃𝜆𝑝𝑃𝑃) (20) 
Finally, the production function being the well-known function à la Leontief and assuming 
that outcome is not labor restricted result in: 
𝑌 = 𝑢𝐾 (21) 
where 𝑢 represents the rate of capacity utilization. Under these hypotheses, the goods market 
equilibrium is given by: 
𝑌 = 𝐶𝑤 + 𝐶𝑐 + 𝐼 (22) 
Substituting each function, noting 𝜋 the profit share10 and 𝜆 = 𝐿 𝐾⁄  the debt ratio, and 
assuming (temporarily) that this ratio is exogenous, the short-run goods market equilibrium is 
given by:
11
 
𝑢∗ = Φ[𝛾 + (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝛿 + (𝑐𝑐 − 𝜆𝑖)𝑖𝑙𝜆] (23) 
where the term in brackets is assumed to be positive and where Φ = {(1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝜋 −
{1 − [1 − (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝜃]𝜆𝑝Ω}(1 − 𝜋)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
}
−1
 is also assumed to be positive to satisfy the 
Keynesian stability assumption. 
[Table 3 around here] 
                                                 
8
 This is made necessary by the fact that, investment being the only autonomous component of the 
aggregate demand in our framework, the model converges to a zero solution if 𝛾 = 0. Introducing 
capital depreciation allows a positive solution even if 𝛾 = 0. 
Of course, the rate of accumulation can’t be lastingly null or negative in a capitalist economy. 
However, it may be the case in a short or medium period of time. 
9
 The capitalists’ net income is assumed to be positive, involving some restrictions on the capital 
depreciation and/or default (𝐹𝑓 + 𝑖𝑙𝐿 > 𝛿𝐾 + 𝜃𝜆𝑝𝑃𝑃). Besides, it is assumed that principal payment 
affects the financing capacity of capitalists, not their consumption. 
10
 The profit share is here assumed to be exogenous. See Charpe and Flaschel (2013) for a model 
with an endogenous determining of income distribution.  
11
 Note that the rate of growth of the wage bill, 𝑊 = (1 − 𝜋)𝑌, adjusts to the rate of growth of 
income, 𝑌 = 𝑢𝐾, which is equal to the rate of accumulation, hence 𝑔 = 𝛾. 
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The comparative statistics are reported in Table 3. As the issue about defaults will be 
analyzed in a subsequent section, we suppose here that 𝜃 = 0. It must be noted that most 
Keynesian results are preserved whatever the value of 𝜆𝑝 and 𝜆𝑖: increases in both the rate of 
accumulation (𝛾), the rate of depreciation (𝛿) or the propensities to consume (𝑐𝑦𝑤 and 𝑐𝑐) as 
well as a decrease in the profit share (𝜋) entail a rise in the rate of capacity utilization. 
Turning to considerations about households’ debt, several points deserve attention.12 First, the 
greater the value of 𝜆𝑝 or 𝜆𝑖, the smaller the rate of capacity utilization because debt servicing 
acts as a more restrictive discipline device on the older workers consumption.  
Second, an increase in 𝑖𝑙 or in 𝜆 induces a rise in the amount of interests on loans. The 
resulting effect in 𝑢∗ depends on the value of 𝜆𝑖. If 𝜆𝑖 = 1, more interests on loans entail a 
shift in income from older workers (who fully consume their disposable income) to capitalists 
(who save a fraction of their income), therefore a fall in consumption and then a fall in 𝑢∗. On 
the contrary, assuming 𝜆𝑖 = 0 means that older workers don’t adjust their consumption and 
borrow to pay their interests; the aggregate workers consumption remains unaffected while 
the capitalists consumption is feed by the interests they receive; it results a rise in 𝑢∗. 
Third, it is worth examining what happens if debt servicing plays as a perfect discipline 
device (𝜆𝑝 = 𝜆𝑖 = 1) when the economic growth is very weak (𝛾 → 0). In this case, 
remembering that 𝛾 → 0 implies Ω → 1, the goods market equilibrium can be rewritten: 
𝑢∗ =
𝛿−𝑖𝑙𝜆
𝜋
 (24) 
Interestingly, the equilibrium is no longer dependent on the young workers’ propensity to 
consume (𝑐𝑦𝑤) because the positive effect of an increase in 𝑐𝑦𝑤 on youth consumption is 
completely offset by the negative effect on the consumption of their elders. 
In the short run, the debt ratio is assumed to be exogenously given. But of course it isn’t. In 
the long run, it can be shown that: 
?̇? = (1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
(1 − 𝜋)𝑢 − [𝛾 − (1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝑖𝑙]𝜆 (25) 
where the dot denotes the rate of change (?̇? = 𝑑𝜆 𝑑𝑡⁄ ). The dynamics of 𝜆 is given by: 
                                                 
12
 We don’t insist on the negative sign of 𝑑𝑢∗ 𝑑𝑉⁄  which principally results from the structure of 
the model: as 𝑉 increases, the same wage bill is divided among more vintage which implies a cut in 
the young workers’ income and then a cut in the rate of capacity utilization. This outcome is closely 
related to the hypothesis that the workers’ borrowing is restricted to the only first period of their span 
of life. 
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𝑑?̇?
𝑑𝜆
= (1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
(1 − 𝜋)
𝑑𝑢∗
𝑑𝜆
+ (1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝑖𝑙 − 𝛾 (26) 
with: 
𝑑𝑢∗
𝑑𝜆
= Φ(𝑐𝑐 − 𝜆𝑖)𝑖 (27) 
so that: 
𝑑?̇?
𝑑𝜆
= [1 − 𝜆𝑖 + (1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
(1 − 𝜋)Φ(𝑐𝑐 − 𝜆𝑖)] 𝑖𝑙 − 𝛾 (28) 
whose sign depends on the value of several parameters including 𝜆𝑖. In addition, the condition 
for the debt ratio to remain constant is: 
𝜆∗ =
(1−𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
(1−𝜋)
𝛾−(1−𝜆𝑖)𝑖𝑙
𝑢 (29) 
or, in the plane (𝜆, 𝑢): 
?̇? = 0     ⇔    𝑢 =
𝛾−(1−𝜆𝑖)𝑖𝑙
(1−𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
(1−𝜋)
𝜆∗ (30) 
This is a linear function (the constant debt ratio curve) whose slope can be positive or 
negative depending on the sign of the numerator. 
The goods market equilibrium given by 𝑢∗ can also be represented in the plane (𝜆, 𝑢) by a 
straight line (the goods market equilibrium curve) whose intercept, Φ[𝛾 + (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝛿], is 
positive and whose slope, 
𝑑𝑢∗
𝑑𝜆
= Φ(𝑐𝑐 − 𝜆𝑖)𝑖𝑙, takes the sign of the term in parentheses. 
Finally, the long-run equilibrium is given by the intersection of the two curves. 
It must be stressed that 𝜆𝑖 has a greater influence than 𝜆𝑝 in the long-run analysis because it 
affects the sign of both 𝑑?̇? 𝑑𝜆⁄  and 𝑑𝑢∗ 𝑑𝜆⁄ . Consequently, we suppose in the next section 
that workers reduce their consumption to pay their interests on loans (𝜆𝑖 = 1). We leave the 
issues about borrowing the interests (𝜆𝑖 = 0) or defaulting workers (𝜃 > 0) for further 
sections. 
2.4. Long-run properties if the payment of interests plays as a discipline 
device on consumption 
It is assumed here that 𝜆𝑖 = 1 and 𝜃 = 0. Note that the denominator of equation (29) 
simplifies so that: 
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𝜆∗ =
(1−𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
(1−𝜋)
𝛾
𝑢 (31) 
The convergence condition depends on the sign of the derivative: 
𝑑?̇?
𝑑𝜆
= − [(1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
(1 − 𝜋)Φ(1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙 + 𝛾] (32) 
A sufficient condition for this derivative to be negative is that the rate of accumulation (𝛾) is 
positive. However, even if 𝛾 < 0, the system remains stable as long as: 
(1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
(1 − 𝜋)Φ(1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙 > −𝛾 (33) 
We suppose that this condition holds. The graphical solution corresponds to Figure 1. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
The numerator of the constant debt ratio curve (equation 31) simplifies so that its slope is 
positive and independent from the interest rate.  
On the other hand, the slope of the goods market equilibrium curve (equation 23) is negative. 
Note that there is no dynamics here as the rate of capacity utilization is fixed instantly to its 
equilibrium level 𝑢∗. 
The main outcome is that the long-run equilibrium (𝜆∗, 𝑢∗) is both positive and stable. In 
other words, there’s no risk of households debt unsustainability as it is the case for the public 
debt as soon as consumption depends on income, i.e. as soon as the payment of interests 
disciplines the workers consumption. As pointed by Charpe and Flaschel (2013), “the 
recessionary eﬀect of higher debt stabilizes the accumulation of debt because it reduces the 
disposable income of workers as well as their level of consumption” (p.53). This result 
confirms that of Dutt (2006, p.652). It also confirms Charpe and Flaschel (2013) as well as 
Hein (2012) in the sense that, in their models, instability stems from an endogenous shift in 
some parameters: the increase in the propensity to borrow, the rise in the profit share, etc. It 
seems thus useful to distinguish the issue of the stability in itself (that is for a given value of 
the parameters) with another issue that questions the stability of the economic system if some 
parameters are subject to endogenous changes (see below). 
[Table 4 around here] 
The comparative statistics are reported in Table 4. About the impacts on the rate of capacity 
utilization, the short-run results for several parameters (𝑐𝑦𝑤, 𝜋, 𝜆𝑝 and 𝑉) are confirmed 
provided that the constraint 𝛾 > (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙 is satisfied. Otherwise, the short-run effect is more 
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than offset by an opposite effect in the workers’ consumption resulting from the change in the 
payment of interests. 
Assume for instance a rise in young workers’ borrowing (𝑐𝑦𝑤 increases). The two curves on 
Figure 1 make a clockwise rotation around their own points of intersection with the horizontal 
axis. This results in an unambiguous rise in the debt ratio. Besides, if 𝛾 > (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙, the 
dominant rotation is that of the goods market equilibrium curve that brings about an increase 
in the rate of capacity utilization (𝑢∗) as the rise of wages resulting from a relatively high rate 
of economic growth (𝛾) makes it possible for young borrowing workers to support a higher 
level of consumption. Conversely, if 𝛾 < (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙, the dominant rotation is that of the 
constant debt ratio curve: the previous effect is dominated by the debt burden impact which 
involves a shift in income from borrowers to creditors who have a lower propensity to 
consume; then a drop both in consumption and economic activity. Such outcome has already 
been underlined in several contributions including Dutt (2006, p.355), Hein (2012, p.25), and 
Charpe and Flaschel (2013, p.53).  
Now assume a shift in 𝜆𝑝 (from 0 to 1). The two curves on Figure 1 make a counter-clockwise 
rotation around their point of intersection with the horizontal axis. This implies an 
unambiguous drop in the debt ratio resulting from older workers paying back the principal to 
their creditors. If 𝛾 > (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙, the rate of capacity utilization decreases too because, as in 
the short run, older workers have to worsen their consumption in order to service the principal 
payment. Conversely, if 𝛾 < (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙: the lower level of indebtedness involves low interests 
paid to capitalists, therefore a higher older workers’ consumption that enhances the rate of 
capacity utilization. 
The only ambiguous effect on the equilibrium debt ratio (𝜆∗) results from a change in 𝛾: on 
the first hand, an increase in 𝛾 boosts economic activity, wages and then youth indebtedness; 
in the other hand, it reduces the share of the previously contracted debt in the national income. 
Besides, an increase in the rate of interest entails a decline in the older workers’ consumption 
(as 𝜆𝑖 = 1), hence a decline in economic activity, wages and, again, youth indebtedness. 
Eventually, it must be stressed that a very weak economic growth (𝛾 → 0 implying Ω → 1) 
implies that principal payment offsets the new contracted loans. There is no variation of loans 
and the long-run debt ratio remains close to zero. In that case, the long-run rate of capacity 
utilization simply becomes 𝑢∗ = 𝛿 𝜋⁄ . 
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2.5. More comments about workers’ consumption 
The workers consumption functions proposed in the existing literature generally take the 
following form:
13
 
𝐶𝑤 = 𝑊 − 𝑖𝑙𝐿 + ?̇? (34) 
At a first glance, the consistency of such ‘without microeconomic foundation’ specification is 
questioning. First, what is the relevance of the introduction of workers borrowing when their 
consumption is lower than their wages (𝐶𝑤 < 𝑊)? Second, this formulation can suggest that 
workers enter in perpetual debt as soon as they borrow (?̇? > 0): how can they pay the 
principal if they consume more than their income in every period (𝐶𝑤 > 𝑊 − 𝑖𝑙𝐿)? 
An important contribution of our overlapping generations model is to provide 
‘microeconomic foundations’ to the above specification. First, it confirms that borrowing is 
fully consistent with the case where workers consume less than their whole wages. Second, 
the proof is made that the ‘without microeconomic foundation’ specification remains 
consistent if the principal payment is taken into account (provided that 𝛾 > 0 so that Ω < 1). 
Indeed, assuming 𝜆𝑝 = 1, it can be shown that: 
𝐶𝑤 = 𝑊 − 𝑖𝑙𝐿 + (1 − Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
𝑊 (35) 
where the last term corresponds to the variation in borrowing (?̇?). Thus, the constraint that 
workers don’t consume more than their income during their lifetime (the intertemporal budget 
constraint) is fully consistent with the result that workers (taken as an aggregate) consume 
more than their income at time 𝑡. The reason lies in economic growth that makes it possible 
for young workers to consume today a fraction of their further, growing wages while older 
workers pay back the principal which is proportional with their previous, lower wages.
14
 
In other words, the ‘without microeconomic foundation’ specifications where principal 
payment is omitted and where it is assumed that borrowing enables workers to consume more 
than their income are fully consistent with the results of our overlapping generations model 
including the principal payment. 
It is also worth to compare workers consumption with their wages, that is: 
                                                 
13
 See for instance Dutt (2006), Hein (2012), or Charpe and Flaschel (2013). 
14
 On the contrary, workers consume no more than their income if 𝛾 → 0 (i.e. Ω → 1). They 
consume less than their income if 𝛾 < 0 (i.e. Ω > 1). 
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𝐶𝑤−𝑊
𝐾
=
(1−𝜆𝑝Ω)(1−𝜋)𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
(1 −
𝑖𝑙
𝛾
) 𝑢∗ (36) 
If 𝛾 is positive (hence Ω < 1), the sign is given by the last term in parentheses. Therefore 
borrowing enables the aggregate consumption of workers to be greater than their wage 
provided that 𝛾 > 𝑖𝑙: the amount of borrowing is higher than the amount of debt servicing 
since the high rate of growth (which reduces the debt ratio) goes together with a cheap rate of 
interest. Conversely, workers consume less than their wage when 𝛾 > 𝑖𝑙: the amount of 
borrowing is now lower than the amount of debt servicing because of a low rate of growth 
and a high rate of interest. 
Another, central implication of the model is that an increase in the young workers’ 
consumption implies more sacrifices for their elders. A way to show this is to calculate the 
effect of a shift in the ‘propensity to borrow’ (𝑐𝑦𝑤) on the ratio 𝐶𝑜𝑤 𝐶𝑦𝑤⁄  where the young 
workers’ consumption is given by equation (6) while their elders consumption function is: 
𝐶𝑜𝑤 = 𝐶𝑤 − 𝐶𝑦𝑤 (37) 
After substitution and manipulation, it comes that: 
𝑑
𝐶𝑜𝑤
𝐶𝑦𝑤
𝑑𝑐𝑦𝑤
= −
𝑉−1+[
𝑖𝑙
𝛾
(1−𝜆𝑝Ω)+𝜆𝑝Ω]
(1+𝑐𝑦𝑤)
2 < 0 (38) 
Thus an increase 𝑐𝑦𝑤 induces a decrease in the consumption of the older workers relative to 
that of the youth generation. 
Even if this article doesn’t put the stress on the explanations of the workers behavior, this 
outcome raises questions about the conspicuous consumption and the relative income 
hypotheses which are frequently put forward in recent literature.
15
 Actually, let us suppose an 
increase in the profit share. This entails a drop in economic activity and consumption for each 
agent, but the aggregate consumption for workers decreases relative to that of capitalists. 
According to the relative income hypothesis, assume that workers attempt to preserve their 
relative standard of life by increasing their ‘propensity to borrow’ (𝑐𝑦𝑤).
16
 However, this rise 
is good for young workers to the detriment of their elders. So, borrowing doesn’t make it 
                                                 
15
 See for instance Barba and Pivetti (2009), Palley (2010), Wisman (2013), Kappeler and Schütz 
(2014), Kim et al. (2014a, 2014b). 
16
 Actually, two alternative specifications may be considered. First, the value of the propensity to 
borrow may depend form the profit share, for instance: 𝑐𝑦𝑤 = 𝑐𝑦 + 𝜁𝜋. Second, the propensity to 
borrow 𝑐𝑦𝑤 may apply to the discrepancy between profits and wages as in 𝐶𝑤 = 𝑊 + 𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝜋
1−𝜋
− 𝑖𝑙𝐿. 
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possible to improve the standards of life of workers in a homogeneous way. That questions 
the relevance of the models where the relative income hypothesis is based on a borrowing 
behavior. The reason is that if a household enhances his standard of life by borrowing, he has 
to make sacrifices in the following periods to service his debt.
17
 
Such behavior leads to another interesting outcome: as the rise in 𝑐𝑦𝑤 boosts both the rate of 
capacity utilization and the debt ratio, the income of capitalists is enhanced as well as their 
consumption. In our framework, it can be shown that the workers attempt fails so that 𝐶𝑤 𝐶𝑐⁄  
suffers from a new decline. What happens if young workers insist? They raise their propensity 
to borrow once again, that involves the same consequences, then another rise in 𝑐𝑦𝑤, etc. 
Finally, the system which is stable in itself (that is, for a given value of the parameters) can 
become unstable as soon as one of its parameters is subject to an endogenous change. That is 
the kind of instability that is highlighted by some economists: the system could reach a stable 
equilibrium but an agent modifies his behavior because he isn’t satisfied by some properties 
of this equilibrium (here, the inequality in consumptions).
18
 
2.6. Long-run properties if the payment of interests doesn’t play as a 
discipline device on consumption 
We now assume that the payment of interests doesn’t play as a discipline device on 
consumption, i.e. 𝜆𝑖 = 0. As workers don’t save, they have to borrow to pay their interests. Of 
course, such assumption is inconsistent with the intertemporal budget constraint. As it had 
already been underlined, our goal here is mainly methodological. We attempt to answer to the 
question: what happens if the interests payment is omitted in the consumption function?  
That may be a cause of households over-indebtedness. Under the ceteris paribus hypothesis, 
it results in a higher rate of capacity utilization (𝑑𝑢∗ 𝑑⁄ 𝜆𝑖 < 0) because of the rise in the older 
workers’ consumptions (equation 23 and Table 3). Conversely, the necessity to borrow for 
paying the interests leads to a greater equilibrium debt ratio (equation 29). 
If 𝜆𝑖 = 0, the debt ratio dynamics becomes: 
                                                 
17
 At this stage, a nuance should be introduced: if the borrowing behavior isn’t fully consistent with 
the relative income hypothesis, it would be easier to combine with the conspicuous consumption 
hypothesis. Actually, young workers can buy the same big car as capitalists’, but they have to eat 
potatoes in the following periods to service their debt. 
18
 On the contrary, the well-known problem of public debt unsustainability stems from the 
instability of the system in itself (for a given value of the parameters). 
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𝑑?̇?
𝑑𝜆
= Ψ𝑖𝑙 − 𝛾 ≶ 0 (39) 
where Ψ = 1 + (1 − 𝜆𝑟Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
(1 − 𝜋)Φ𝑐𝑐 is higher than unity. As a result, a sufficient 
condition for the derivative to be positive is that 𝑖𝑙 > 𝛾. In addition, the slope of the 
equilibrium rate of capacity utilization in the plane (𝜆, 𝑢) is now positive as: 
𝑑𝑢∗
𝑑𝜆
= Φ𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑙 (40) 
It can be shown that three cases must be distinguished: 
(a) 𝑖𝑙 > 𝛾 (cf. Figure 2); 
(b) 𝑖𝑙 < 𝛾 but Ψ𝑖𝑙 > 𝛾 since  
𝑑𝑢∗
𝑑𝜆
|
𝑢=𝑢∗
>
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝜆
|
?̇?=0
 (cf. Figure 3); 
(c) 𝑖𝑙 < 𝛾 and  Ψ𝑖𝑙 < 𝛾 since 
𝑑𝑢∗
𝑑𝜆
|
𝑢=𝑢∗
<
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝜆
|
?̇?=0
 (cf. Figure 4). 
[Figure 2 around here] 
[Figure 3 around here] 
[Figure 4 around here] 
The two first cases produce instability and households’ debt unsustainability. In particular, in 
case (b) the convergence toward the equilibrium debt ratio 𝜆∗ systematically raises 𝜆, 
inducing an increase in 𝑢∗, then an increase in 𝜆… Only the third case (c) produces stability. 
Note that the condition to be in (c) rather than in (b) is: 
(1−𝑐𝑐)𝜋
(1−𝜆𝑝Ω)(1−𝜋)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
>
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑙
𝛾−𝑖𝑙
+ 1 (41) 
Stability thus results from high 𝛾, 𝑉, 𝜆𝑝 and 𝜋, while 𝑖𝑙, 𝑐𝑐 and 𝑐𝑦𝑤 must be small. Here again, 
the 𝜆𝑝 parameter doesn’t play a crucial role in the analysis except that 𝜆𝑝 = 1 makes it more 
likely to reach system stability and debt sustainability.
19
 
2.7. Workers default on principal payment 
We now assume that workers service their debt (𝜆𝑖 = 𝜆𝑝 = 1) but that some of them make 
default (𝜃 > 0). As it has been pointed above, our main goal is methodological, that is we 
                                                 
19
 As noted earlier, there is no symmetry between the two hypotheses 𝜆𝑝 = 0 and 𝜆𝑖 = 0: the 
absence of principal payment (𝜆𝑝 = 0) doesn’t induce any increase in borrowing; on the contrary, it is 
the new borrowing resulting from 𝜆𝑖 = 0 which can cause system instability. 
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first analyze the consequences of defaults on the properties of our model. As a result, it will 
be shown that, everything else being equal, defaults have a positive impact on economic 
activity as well as on the global income of creditors. In other words, specific assumptions 
should be introduced in the model, such as state of confidence, to illustrate the financial 
fragility ensuing from defaults. 
Let us remind first that, according to our definition of defaults as a fraction of workers’ 
principal payment, defaults don’t have any direct impact on the loans level (Table 2): if 
workers owe 𝑃𝑃 to their creditors, the cut in this loans level is 𝑃𝑃 if they pay 𝑃𝑃 as well as if 
they pay (1 − 𝜃)𝑃𝑃 and make default on 𝜃𝑃𝑃. 
Debt dynamics and stability conditions thus remain unchanged. The system converges toward 
its long-run equilibrium (equations 23 and 31).
20
 In other words, defaults don’t involve any 
households’ debt unsustainability by itself. 
[Table 5 around here] 
The other main result is that the only effects of defaults on the model go through the 
multiplier effect: consumption of older workers increases since a default makes it possible for 
them to keep more income for consumption; this effect is partly offset by the decrease of 
capitalists’ consumption resulting for default altering their income. Defaults then support the 
economic activity, so the wage bill and the young workers’ indebtedness. In other words, 
defaults indirectly imply a rise in the rate of capacity utilization and, consequently, in the debt 
ratio (Table 5). In addition, it can be shown that an increase in the ‘propensity to borrow’ 
(𝑐𝑦𝑤) whose effect on the rate of capacity utilization were negative if 𝛾 < (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙 (cf. 
Table 4) can now have a positive impact. 
Several extensions would be explored to deal with the analysis of defaults and their 
consequences in a more realistic way. First, the rate of defaults would be made endogenous, 
assuming for instance that it increases with a fall in the workers income (Charpe and Flaschel, 
2013). 
In addition, it would be interesting to introduce the reactions of capitalists (or banks) when 
they face increasing defaults. Intuitively, defaults should cause a decline in the consumption 
of capitalists. However, the impact remains ambiguous as the direct negative impact on 
capitalists’ income goes together with the indirect positive impact via the rate of capacity 
                                                 
20
 It also can be shown that, in the long run, the amount of capitalists’ deposits grow at the same 
rate (𝛾) than both the stock of capital and the amount of debt. 
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utilization. So it isn’t sure that capitalists (or banks) taken as a whole suffer from a rise in 
default. Nevertheless, on microeconomics grounds, one can expect that some of them suffer a 
loss (the ones who had lent to the defaulting workers). The likelihood to suffer a loss may 
involve a degradation in the state of confidence. Capitalists can therefore try to protect 
themselves, firstly by increasing the interest rate of loans (𝑖𝑙). According to Table 4, it implies 
a decline in the debt ratio. However, this decline doesn’t result from a decrease in the 
‘propensity to borrow’ but from a fall in the rate of capacity utilization. In other words, the 
model specification isn’t appropriate here since the young workers behavior isn’t affected by 
the rate of interests.
21
 
Another policy for capitalists is credit rationing. This can be formally introduced by assuming 
that only a fraction of the ‘propensity to borrow’ desired by the workers (𝑐𝑦𝑤) is granted by 
the creditors, this fraction being inversely related to the (previously made endogenous) default 
ratio (𝜃). For sake of space, we don’t develop this specification here. However, Tables 4 and 
5 give an idea of the outcomes that may be expected. Assume for instance an increase in the 
profit share (𝜋) implying a decline in both the rate of capacity utilization and the debt ratio.22 
Because their wages fall, older workers face difficulties in servicing their debt, hence an 
increase in the default ratio (𝜃). As some capitalists suffer a loss, the credit is rationed. That 
entails a decrease in the young workers consumption which implies, through the multiplier 
effect, a new fall in economic activity and wages, therefore a new rise in the default ratio, 
etc.
23
 Such scenario doesn’t involve downward instability by itself as the fall in the young 
workers propensity to consume stops as soon as 𝑐𝑦𝑤 reaches zero: if capitalists refuse to lend, 
consumer debt vanishes and we go back to the usual Keynesian model without borrowing. 
Note that there can’t be upward instability in such scenario as the young workers propensity 
to consume is upward bounded by (1 + 𝑐𝑦𝑤). It is not the case in Charpe and Flaschel (2013) 
where the propensity to borrow depends partly on workers’ desire, and partly on banks 
performance. According to the authors, this specification captures the supply-side explanation 
of consumer debt: the credit expansion can result from a rise in the banks supply of loans 
which could itself be related to banks performance. This initially causes upward instability as 
the “proactive bank behaviour generates a destabilizing feedback channel in which debt and 
                                                 
21
 See Charpe and Flaschel (2013) for another specification including such a policy. 
22
 It is also assumed that 𝛾 > (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙, otherwise an increase in 𝜋 would have an undetermined 
effect on 𝑢∗. 
23
 See also Dutt (2006, p.359) and Charpe and Flaschel (2013, p.56-57). 
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consumption feed each other, leading to over-indebtedness” (p.55). However, this lately 
causes downward instability as “debt default reduces bank net equity and produces a 
tightening of credit” (p.57).24 
3. Essay 2: Workers’ saving at least partially finances their own debt 
Following Kim et al. (2014a), we now assume that workers’ saving is positive and enables a 
partial financing of the workers’ debt. Of course, we keep our overlapping generations 
framework and put the stress on the principal payment issue. 
For sake of both space and simplicity, it is assumed that workers don’t make default (𝜃 = 0) 
and don’t borrow for paying the interests on loans (𝜆𝑖 = 1). It is also assumed that the rate of 
accumulation is non-negative (𝛾 ≥ 0). 
3.1. Model structure and stock-flow consistency 
The ex post accounting are reported in Table 6 (Balance-sheet matrix) and Table 7 
(Transactions flow matrix). 
[Table 6 around here] 
[Table 7 around here] 
An important implication of the overlapping generation framework is that each new 
generation must inherit the deposits of the older generation of the previous period. Both 
young and older workers so receive interests on their deposits. Young workers borrow 𝑁𝐿 to 
consume more than their income. Of course, it should be surprising to suppose that young 
workers borrow whereas they have inherited their parent deposits. The most convincing 
answer could be to assimilate monetary deposits to some precautionary saving and to assume 
that young workers prefer to borrow to finance some (conspicuous) consumption rather than 
empty their deposits. 
For sake of simplicity and without any consequence on the results, it is also assumed that they 
make deposits (?̇?𝑦𝑤) in the same way as their elders. Hence the following loans contracted by 
the young workers: 
                                                 
24
 Somehow, Hein (2012) proposes a pure model of credit rationing in which “credit going to 
workers does not depend on workers’ net income but on rentiers’ income and saving” (p.8), the 
“rentiers’ saving [being] split in fixed proportion between additional lending to workers and buying  
additional equity issued by the firms” (p.7). 
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𝑁𝐿 = 𝐶𝑦𝑤 − (𝑊𝑦 + 𝑖𝑚𝑀𝑦𝑤) + ?̇?𝑦𝑤 (42) 
Older workers for their part use their income to consume, to service the debt, principal and 
interests, and to make deposits (?̇?𝑜𝑤): 
𝑊𝑜 + 𝑖𝑚𝑀𝑜𝑤 = 𝐶𝑜𝑤 + 𝜆𝑝𝑃𝑃 + 𝑖𝑙𝐿 + ?̇?𝑜𝑤 (43) 
By construction, the variation of loans (?̇? = 𝑁𝐿 − 𝜆𝑝𝑃𝑃) is equal to the variation of deposits 
made both by workers (?̇?𝑤 = ?̇?𝑦𝑤 + ?̇?𝑜𝑤) and capitalists (?̇?𝑐), so that: 
𝑁𝐿 − 𝜆𝑝𝑃𝑃 = ?̇? = ?̇?𝑤 + ?̇?𝑐 (44) 
Assume that both ?̇? and ?̇?𝑤 are positive. It must be stressed that the accounting framework 
allows for two opposite streams of funding. On the one hand, if ?̇? > ?̇?𝑤, workers deposits are 
too low to finance their debt and must be completed by the capitalists deposits (?̇?𝑐 > 0). On 
the other hand, if ?̇? < ?̇?𝑤, workers deposits exceed the debt financing. As a result, the 
variation of deposits made by capitalists is negative (?̇?𝑐 < 0) which means that the excess of 
workers deposits is captured by capitalists and contributes to the investment financing.
25
 
Banks receive the interests on loans (𝑖𝑙𝐿) and distribute the interests on deposits (𝑖𝑚𝑀). The 
difference (if any) corresponds to the banks profit (𝐹𝑏). We take again the core assumption 
that banks belong to capitalists. Capitalists’ income is thus the sum of the interests on their 
deposits, banks’ profit and firms’ net profit (𝐹 = 𝐹𝑏 + 𝐹𝑓). The saving of capitalists finances 
the other agents through bank deposits and purchase of equities. 
𝐹 + 𝑖𝑚𝑀𝑐 − 𝐶𝑐 = ?̇?𝑐 + ?̇? (45) 
The accounting of firms is the same than in the first essay. 
The main differences with the first essay are that both young and older workers are assumed 
to make deposits in each period and that the income now includes the interests on deposits. 
Drawing on Kim et al. (2014a), two scenarios are distinguished according to the workers’ 
behavior. In a scenario a, older workers first use their wage to meet debt servicing 
obligations, and then consume a conventional fraction of their disposable wage. Latter, in a 
scenario b, it will be supposed that older workers first spend a part of their wage in 
consumption, and then distribute their saving between debt servicing and monetary deposits. 
                                                 
25
 Of course, the latter case inconsistent with a stationary equilibrium in a growing economy. 
However, it can occur in a short or medium period of time, depending on both the agents’ behavior 
and the value of the parameters. 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.87
 23 
3.2. Workers’ consumption (scenario a) 
In scenario a, it is assumed that young as well as older workers have a lower than unity 
propensity to consume out of their disposable income (𝑐𝑤). However, young workers borrow 
to finance a part of their consumption spending.
26
 For the younger vintage 𝜐 at time 𝑡, we thus 
have:
27
 
𝐶𝜐,𝑡 = (𝑐𝑤 + 𝑐𝑦𝑤)
𝑊𝑡+𝑖𝑚𝑀𝑤,𝑡
𝑉
 (46) 
and 
𝐿𝜐,𝑡 = 𝑁𝐿𝑡 = 𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑊𝑡+𝑖𝑚𝑀𝑤,𝑡
𝑉
 (47) 
According to the overlapping generations framework, the intertemporal budget restriction is 
satisfied if, in the following periods, these workers first service their debt and then distribute 
their disposable income between consumption and deposits. The consumption behavior for 
the same vintage 𝜐 as it grows older is then: 
𝐶𝜐,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝑐𝑤 (
𝑊𝑡+𝑛+𝑖𝑚𝑀𝑤,𝑡+𝑛
𝑉
− 𝑃𝑃𝜐,𝑡+𝑛 − 𝑖𝑙𝐿𝜐,𝑡+𝑛−1)          (𝑛 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑉 − 1) (48) 
where 
𝑃𝑃𝜐,𝑡+𝑛 =
𝐿𝑣,𝑡
𝑉−1
          (𝑛 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑉 − 1) (49) 
and 
𝐿𝜐,𝑡+𝑛−1 = 𝐿𝜐,𝑡+𝑛−2 − 𝑃𝑃𝑣,𝑡+𝑛−1          (𝑛 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑉 − 1) (50) 
The aggregate amount of principal payment at time t is then:
28
 
𝑃𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝜐,𝑡
𝑉−1
𝜐=1 = 𝑐𝑦𝑤
Ω(𝑊𝑡+𝑖𝑚𝑀𝑤,𝑡)
𝑉
 (51) 
                                                 
26
 In Kim et al. (2014a), borrowing depends on a consumption target that explicitly relates to the 
emulation effect of the relative income hypothesis which is developed in Setterfield and Kim (2013). 
27
 As it has been pointed, this is a simplifying hypothesis that has no significant implication on the 
model outcomes. If young workers don’t save and if 𝑐𝑤 stands for the propensity to consume of the 
only older workers, it can be shown that 𝑐𝑤 has to be replaced by (𝑉 − 1)𝑐𝑤 𝑉⁄  in the aggregate 
consumption function and further in the model resolution. 
It is also assumed that every vintage has the same amount of deposits at the beginning of every 
period which shouldn’t be the case because the variation in deposits differs for the young and the older 
workers. However, every vintage is consecutively young and older and a young generation inherits 
from his predecessors. We consequently suppose that the differences in the amount of deposits are 
small in the long period. 
28
 In this computing, the wage bill 𝑊𝑡 and the monetary deposits 𝑀𝑤,𝑡 are supposed to grow at the 
same rate 𝑔. 
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where, as in the first essay: 
Ω =
1
𝑔(𝑉−1)
[1 − (1 + 𝑔)1−𝑉] (52) 
Note that workers saving can’t be legitimated here by a postponement of consumption 
because the propensity to consume out of income is the same at every age. It can’t no longer 
be explained by debt servicing because this is extra-saving, after the workers have service 
their debt. Here once again, the better reason seems to invoke some precautionary saving. 
Finally, aggregating for the 𝑉 workers vintage at time 𝑡, substituting, introducing 𝜆𝑝 (𝜆𝑝 = 1 
if principal paiement is taken into account; 𝜆𝑝 = 0 if it is omitted) and adopting continuous 
time, it comes that: 
𝐶𝑤 = [𝑐𝑤 + (1 − 𝑐𝑤𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
] (𝑊 + 𝑖𝑚𝑀𝑤) − 𝑐𝑤𝑖𝑙𝐿 (53) 
?̇? = (1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω)𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑊+𝑖𝑚𝑀𝑤
𝑉
 (54) 
and 
?̇?𝑤 = (1 − 𝑐𝑤) [(1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
) (𝑊 + 𝑖𝑚𝑀𝑤) − 𝑖𝑙𝐿] (55) 
where the last equation stands for the variation in workers deposits. The term in brackets (the 
disposable income after debt servicing, principal and interests) is supposed to be positive. 
3.3. Equilibrium and dynamics analyses (scenario a) 
The only innovation is that capitalists no longer receive the whole interests on loans (𝑖𝑙𝐿). 
This amount must be reduced by the interests on the deposits served to the workers (𝑖𝑚𝑀𝑤) 
so: 
𝐶𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐(Π − 𝛿𝐾 + 𝑖𝑙𝐿 − 𝑖𝑚𝑀𝑤) (56) 
where it is assumed that 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑐𝑤. Substituting in the goods market equilibrium (equation 22), 
noting 𝜇𝑤 = 𝑀𝑤 𝐾⁄  the ratio of workers deposits and rearranging leads to: 
𝑢∗ =
[𝑐𝑤−𝑐𝑐+(1−𝑐𝑤𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
]𝑖𝑚𝜇𝑤+𝛾+(1−𝑐𝑐)𝛿−(𝑐𝑤−𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙𝜆
1−𝑐𝑤+(𝑐𝑤−𝑐𝑐)𝜋−(1−𝑐𝑤𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
(1−𝜋)
 (57) 
In this equation, 𝜇𝑤 causes great difficulties because of its own dynamics. The simplest 
solution is to assume that the rate of interest on deposits is zero (𝑖𝑚 = 0). It means that, as in 
the first essay, the whole interests on loans are paid to capitalists as banks profits. Note in 
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addition that assuming 𝑖𝑚 = 0 is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that workers save for 
precautionary purposes. Introducing this assumption, the equilibrium rate of capacity 
utilization becomes: 
𝑢∗ =
𝛾+(1−𝑐𝑐)𝛿−(𝑐𝑤−𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙𝜆
1−𝑐𝑤+(𝑐𝑤−𝑐𝑐)𝜋−(1−𝑐𝑤𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
(1−𝜋)
 (58) 
One can check that the results of the comparative statistics are unchanged (see Table 4). In 
particular, the multiplier effect is lower if principal payment is included (𝜆𝑝 = 1) than if it is 
omitted (𝜆𝑝 = 0). The only innovation is the presence of the workers propensity to consume 
(𝑐𝑤): 
𝑑𝑢∗
𝑑𝑐𝑤
> 0     ⇔      (1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
) (1 − 𝜋)𝑢 − 𝑖𝑙𝜆 > 0 (59) 
This condition simply corresponds to the assumption that the disposable income after debt 
servicing is positive so workers can both consume and make deposits. This condition being 
satisfied, the higher the workers propensity to consume, the greater the economic activity. If 
𝑐𝑤 = 1, the model goes back to the configuration of the first essay where borrowing is 
completely financed by capitalists. In other words, everything else being equal, economy 
activity is higher if the workers’ debt is financed by capitalists because funds are transferred 
toward agents with a higher propensity to consume. 
The change in the debt ratio is the same as in the first essay (assuming 𝜆𝑖 = 1): 
?̇? = (1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
(1 − 𝜋)𝑢 − 𝛾𝜆 (60) 
Here again, the derivative 
𝑑𝑢∗
𝑑𝜆
 being negative, we assume that 𝑑?̇? 𝑑𝜆⁄ < 0 so that the system 
converges towards its long-run equilibrium.
29
 The debt ratio therefore converges toward its 
equilibrium level: 
𝜆∗ =
(1−𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
(1−𝜋)
𝛾
𝑢 (61) 
As before, the debt ratio is smaller if the older workers pay the principal to their creditors 
(𝜆𝑝 = 1). In this case once again, a very weak economic growth (𝛾 → 0 implying Ω → 1) 
results in a zero long-run debt ratio. Workers’ saving then is completely captured by 
capitalists (via banks) and contributes to the investment financing without any retribution. 
                                                 
29
 Actually, the convergence condition is that (1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
(1 − 𝜋)
𝑑𝑢∗
𝑑𝜆
< 𝛾. The derivative 
𝑑𝑢∗
𝑑𝜆
 
being negative, a sufficient condition for 𝑑?̇? 𝑑𝜆⁄  to be negative is 𝛾 > 0. 
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More generally, the direction of the streams of funding is a matter of parameter since at 
equilibrium: 
?̇?−?̇?𝑤
𝐾
= (1 − 𝑐𝑤)(1 − 𝜋)𝑢
∗ {[
1−𝑐𝑤𝜆𝑝Ω
1−𝑐𝑤
+
𝑖𝑙
𝛾
(1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω)]
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
− 1} (62) 
Hence: 
?̇?−?̇?𝑤
𝐾
> 0     ⇔      [
1−𝑐𝑤𝜆𝑝Ω
1−𝑐𝑤
+
𝑖𝑙
𝛾
(1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω)]
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
− 1 > 0 (63) 
It results that a workers contribution to the investment financing is more likely to occur if 𝑐𝑤 
and 𝑐𝑦𝑤 are low and if workers pay the principal (𝜆𝑝 = 1).
30
 
3.4. Workers’ consumption (scenario b) 
In the previous scenario, as pointed by Kim et al. (2014a), “any increase in debt servicing will 
(ceteris paribus) reduce both consumption and saving out of current income” (p. 42). 
However, these authors refer to the data analysis proposed by Lusardi at al. (2011) to 
consider “a second scenario in which workers are assumed to consume a conventional 
fraction of their gross wage income, using the residual to fund either debt servicing or current 
saving, as the demands of the former allow. In this second scenario, then, working households 
regard saving as a luxury that is foregone first (before consumption out of current income is 
affected) in the event that they confront higher debt-servicing obligations” (p. 42). In our 
overlapping framework, the contracted loans by the younger vintage 𝜐 at time 𝑡 amounts to: 
𝐿𝜐,𝑡 = 𝑁𝐿𝑡 = 𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑊𝑡
𝑉
 (64) 
and their consumptions to: 
𝐶𝜐,𝑡 = (𝑐𝑤 + 𝑐𝑦𝑤)
𝑊𝑡
𝑉
 (65) 
The consumption of the same vintage in the following periods becomes: 
𝐶𝜐,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝑐𝑤
𝑊𝑡+𝑛
𝑉
          (𝑛 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑉 − 1) (66) 
The aggregate consumption function in continuous time for the 𝑉 workers vintage at time 𝑡 is 
simply: 
                                                 
30
 Note that a rise in the rate of accumulation 𝛾 increases the eventuality that workers finance 
investment if  𝜆𝑝 = 0 but it has an opposite effect if 𝜆𝑝 = 1 as it implies a decrease in Ω whose effect 
is dominant. 
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𝐶𝑤 = (𝑐𝑤 +
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
) 𝑊 (67) 
The variation of loans can be rewritten: 
?̇? = (1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω)𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑊
𝑉
 (68) 
Finally, the variation of workers’ deposits corresponds to saving on the gross wages 
augmented by the interests on deposits (𝑖𝑚𝑀𝑤) and diminished by the principal (𝜆𝑝Ω
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
𝑊) 
and interests payments (𝑖𝑙𝐿): 
?̇?𝑤 = (1 − 𝑐𝑤 − 𝜆𝑝Ω
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
) 𝑊 + 𝑖𝑚𝑀𝑤 − 𝑖𝑙𝐿 (69) 
3.5. Equilibrium and dynamics analyses (scenario b) 
With the same consumption function for capitalists as in the previous scenario and 
considering once again that 𝑖𝑚 = 0, the goods market equilibrium is now given by: 
𝑢∗ =
𝛾+(1−𝑐𝑐)𝛿+𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑙𝜆
1−𝑐𝑐𝜋−(𝑐𝑤+
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
)(1−𝜋)
 (70) 
The rate of capacity utilization is higher (ceteris paribus) than in the previous scenario
31
 for 
the sake that borrowing boosts the young workers’ consumption spending while debt 
servicing doesn’t lessen the workers consumption (on the contrary, the interests on loans 
increase the capitalists’ consumption). As a consequence, the 𝜆𝑝 parameter no longer appears 
in this equilibrium: economic activity isn’t impeded by the principal payment when 𝜆𝑝 = 1. 
Note also that the derivative 𝑑𝑢∗ 𝑑𝜆⁄  is now positive. As a consequence, the debt ratio doesn’t 
necessarily converge towards its equilibrium (equation 61) since the sign of the derivative 
𝑑?̇?
𝑑𝜆
=
(1−𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
(1−𝜋)𝑐𝑐
1−𝑐𝑐𝜋−(𝑐𝑤+
𝑐𝑦𝑤
𝑉
)(1−𝜋)
𝑖𝑙 − 𝛾 (71) 
can be either positive or negative depending on the value of several parameters. The resulting 
properties are the same than in the first essay, while it was assumed that workers borrow to 
pay their interests (𝜆𝑖 = 0). Actually, if 𝑑?̇? 𝑑𝜆⁄ > 0, the system can be represented by 
Figure 3 where economic activity and debt ratio strengthen each other in a classical spiral: an 
increase in 𝜆 implies an increase in 𝑢 because capitalists consume the interests on loans; 
reciprocally, the increase in 𝑢 entails a rise in wages, in the young workers’ borrowing, and 
                                                 
31
 Indeed, one can check that the numerator of 𝑢∗ is higher in scenario a than in scenario b, and 
that conversely its denominator is lower in scenario a than in scenario b. 
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then in 𝜆. Otherwise, if 𝑑?̇? 𝑑𝜆⁄ < 0, the equilibrium is stable and is represented by Figure 4. 
Note that a higher 𝑐𝑐 leads to greater instability (𝑑?̇? 𝑑𝜆⁄ = 0 if 𝑐𝑐 = 0) whereas a greater 𝜆𝑝 
makes it more likely to obtain a stable equilibrium. 
Besides, as in scenario a, the direction of the stream of funding is a matter of parameter: 
capitalists may contribute to the financing of the workers debt or, conversely, the workers 
saving may contribute to the financing of investment. Moreover, as pointed by Kim et al. 
(2014a), the scenario b holds only if the older workers’ saving is enough to service their debt. 
Formally, the deposits made by these workers (?̇?𝑜𝑤 = ?̇?𝑤 − ?̇?𝑦𝑤) must be positive. After 
substituting and rearranging, it comes that:
32
 
?̇?𝑜𝑤 > 0     ⇔      (1 − 𝑐𝑤)(𝑉 − 1) > [
𝑖𝑙
𝛾
(1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω) + 𝜆𝑝Ω] 𝑐𝑦𝑤 (72) 
This condition is more likely to occur if the rate of accumulation (𝛾) is high and if the 
propensity to consume (𝑐𝑤), the ‘propensity to borrow’ (𝑐𝑦𝑤) and the interest rate (𝑖𝑙) are low. 
Note however that 𝜆𝑝 has an ambiguous impact on this condition since: 
𝑑[
𝑖𝑙
𝛾
(1−𝜆𝑝Ω)+𝜆𝑝Ω]
𝑑𝜆𝑝
= (1 −
𝑖𝑙
𝛾
) Ω ≶ 0 (73) 
In other words, when 𝛾 > 𝑖𝑙 the condition is more easily satisfied (that is, the right member of 
the inequality is smaller) if 𝜆𝑝 = 0: the debt is high both because the rate of growth (𝛾) is 
high and workers don’t pay the principal, but the cheap rate of interest 𝑖𝑙 keeps the amount of 
interests at a low level which enables to make deposits. Conversely, when 𝛾 < 𝑖𝑙 the 
condition is more easily satisfied if 𝜆𝑝 = 1: the debt is weak both because of a low rate of 
growth and workers pay their principal; hence the amount of interests remains at a low level 
despite a high rate of interest so workers can make some deposits. 
On the other hand, if the formal condition isn’t satisfied, not only the capitalists must 
contribute to the workers’ debt financing but the older workers also are unable to service their 
whole debt. In that case, at least three options are open to the workers. First, they may choose 
to reduce 𝑐𝑤 to increase their saving. However, this will cause a fall in aggregate consumption 
and thus in economic activity. This behavior also means that workers consumption is 
disciplined by debt servicing, hence the necessity to go back to the scenario a. 
                                                 
32
 The youngest generation is excluded since it doesn’t face any debt servicing. 
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A second option for the older workers is to borrow a part of their interests from the capitalists. 
Such a solution would nonetheless require a reformulation of the model in order to 
reintroduce the 𝜆𝑖 parameter (with 𝜆𝑖 < 1) whose effects were analyzed in the first essay. 
Such amendment would probably result in an unstable equilibrium and an unsustainable debt 
when the rate of interests is higher relative to the rate of growth. 
Third, some older workers can make default on their debt. Here again, the model would be 
modified in order to reintroduce the 𝜃 parameter and it is likely that the outcomes will meet 
those of the first essay. 
In summary, the scenario b where debt servicing affects saving but not consumption can 
suffer from instability for two different, not exclusive reasons. First, because economic 
activity and debt ratio can feed each other in the usual destabilizing spiral. Second, because 
the lack of saving for debt servicing can generate an increase in workers’ borrowing. 
3.6. Further comments about workers’ consumption 
One can check that, here as in the first essay, the aggregate consumption of workers can be 
greater than their wage. Now, it is a matter of several parameters but it is more likely to occur 
if both propensities (𝑐𝑦𝑤 and 𝑐𝑤) are high and, in scenario a, if 𝑖𝑙 is lower than 𝛾. 
Furthermore, once again, it can be shown that an increase in the propensity to borrow implies 
an increase in the consumption for young workers to the detriment of their elders in both 
scenarios (the ratio 𝐶𝑜𝑤 𝐶𝑦𝑤⁄  declines). The relative income hypothesis is thus faced with the 
same limits than in the first essay: it isn’t fully relevant if it rests on a borrowing behavior. 
However the story changes if the relative income hypothesis directly applies on the propensity 
to consume (𝑐𝑤). If the workers react to a rise in some inequalities (for instance a rise in 𝜋) by 
increasing 𝑐𝑤, they will all enhance their consumption with only small distributive effects 
among them.
33
 This outcome suggests that the relative income hypothesis may be less 
consistent with a rise in the propensity to borrow than with a rise in the lower than unity 
propensity to consume out of wages (or out of income). 
                                                 
33
 These distributive effects result from the decrease in the debt ratio and thus in the amount of debt 
servicing which entail a small rise in 𝐶𝑜𝑤 𝐶𝑦𝑤⁄ : the increase in 𝐶𝑜𝑤 is greater than that of 𝐶𝑦𝑤, but 
𝐶𝑦𝑤 increases nevertheless and young workers don’t have to make any sacrifice. 
However, it is worth to note that the ‘first disappointing consequence’ presented in the first essay 
may hold here: the rise in 𝑐𝑤 may induce a new rise in 𝐶𝑐 𝐶𝑤⁄ . 
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4. Essay 3: Capitalists finance their own debt 
In the third essay, we draw on Bhaduri et al. (2006) who suggest that consumption includes a 
wealth effect that is financed by borrowing for the sake that most capital gains (or losses) are 
only virtual. As the authors remind us, “the market normally works with only a relatively 
small fraction of the total number of stocks actually transacted at the margin. This sets 
notionally the price for these assets, at which their owners might calculate their notional 
capital gains and losses, but without realizing them. And, this must necessarily be so; because, 
if everyone or even a substantial number of the owners of this virtual wealth were to try to 
realize their  notional  gain  through  actual  trading, stock  prices  would  crash  with much of 
the perceived wealth vanishing immediately. Thus, virtual wealth has to remain largely virtual 
by the very logic of its existence!” (Bhaduri et al., 2006, p.413). 
Drawing on Bhaduri et al. (2006), we propose a model where capitalists are supposed to 
borrow in order to finance the wealth effect on their consumption. A core hypothesis here is 
that workers consume their whole wages so that only capitalists have a financing capacity: 
they therefore must finance their own debt. 
However, our model rests upon an important simplification of Bhaduri et al. (2006): the 
wealth evaluation is made with historical rather than notional prices. As for the two previous 
essays, we concentrate on the consequences of the principal payment introduction in a model 
where capitalists’ saving finances capitalists’ debt. The wealth specification with notional 
prices is then a sophistication which is not addressed right now. 
4.1. Model structure and stock-flow consistency 
As before, we suppose a model with four agents: workers, capitalists, banks and firms. Now, 
workers are aggregated all together while a distinction is made between the young capitalists 
and their elders in accordance with our overlapping generations framework. The ex post 
accounting are reported in Table 8 (Balance-sheet matrix) and Table 9 (Transactions flow 
matrix). 
[Table 8 around here] 
[Table 9 around here] 
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According to the overlapping generations framework, it is assumed that young capitalists 
inherit the wealth of the older generation of the previous period. The income of capitalists 
consists of firms’ net profit (𝐹𝑓), banks’ profit (𝐹𝑏) and the interests on their deposits. 
Both young and older capitalists use their income for consumption (𝐶𝑦𝑐, 𝐶𝑜𝑐) and monetary 
deposits (?̇?𝑦𝑐, ?̇?𝑜𝑐). In addition, young capitalists borrow (𝑁𝐿) to finance a part of their 
consumption expenditure. Older capitalists are supposed to commit to service their debt, 
interests (𝑖𝑙𝐿) and principal (𝜆𝑝𝑃𝑃).
34
 The variation of loans is thus ?̇? = 𝑁𝐿 − 𝜆𝑝𝑃𝑃. Besides, 
the older capitalists’ saving is partially employed to buy equities (?̇?). 
Banks collect the monetary deposits which finance the net borrowing, that is ?̇? = ?̇?𝑐, or: 
𝑁𝐿 = ?̇?𝑦𝑐 + ?̇?𝑜𝑐 + 𝜆𝑝𝑃𝑃 (74) 
Gross borrowing is thus partly financed by the deposits and partly by the principal payment. 
The banks’ profit is the difference between the received interests on loans and the paid 
interests on deposits (𝐹𝑏 = 𝑖𝑙𝐿 − 𝑖𝑚𝑀). Once again, it clearly appears that the banks and 
capitalists accountings can be merged together since the former are only connected. In 
addition, as banks’ profit is fully distributed to capitalists, interests on loans paid by capitalists 
come back to them. One can therefore expect that interests play no role in the macroeconomic 
model. 
The aggregation of the younger and older capitalists accounts leads to: 
𝐶𝑐 + ?̇? + 𝑖𝑙𝐿 + ?̇? = 𝐹𝑓 + 𝐹𝑏 + 𝑖𝑚𝑀 + ?̇? (75) 
Substituting and rearranging, it comes that: 
𝐶𝑐 + ?̇? = 𝐹𝑓 (76) 
Hence firms’ profits entirely finance capitalist consumption and their purchase of equities. 
4.2. Capitalists’ consumption 
An overlapping generations framework is assumed once again with 𝑉 vintages for the 
capitalists. The only wealth in the economy is the capital stock (𝐾) whose collateral is the 
amount of equities owned by capitalists. This amount as well as the income (𝐹𝑏 + 𝑖𝑚𝑀 = 𝑖𝑙𝐿) 
is supposed to be homogenously distributed. The young capitalists are assumed to consume a 
                                                 
34
 This constraint can be weakened if older capitalists bequest their debt as well as their wealth to 
their posterity. 
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conventional fraction 𝑐𝑐 of their income and to make monetary deposits with the other 
fraction. Simultaneously, they borrow to finance a consumption connected to their wealth 
with the propensity to borrow 𝑐𝑦𝑐. For the younger vintage 𝜐 at time 𝑡, we thus have: 
𝐶𝜐,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐
𝐹𝑓𝑡−𝛿𝐾𝑡+𝑖𝑙𝐿𝑡
𝑉
+ 𝑐𝑦𝑐
𝐾𝑡
𝑉
 (77) 
and 
𝐿𝜐,𝑡 = 𝑁𝐿𝑡 = 𝑐𝑦𝑐
𝐾𝑡
𝑉
 (78) 
The intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied if, in the following periods, these capitalists 
service their debt before to divide the remaining income between consumption and saving. 
Consumption for the same vintage 𝜐 as it grows older is then: 
𝐶𝑣,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝑐𝑐 (
𝐹𝑓𝑡−𝛿𝐾𝑡+𝑖𝑙𝐿𝑡
𝑉
− 𝑃𝑃𝑣,𝑡+𝑛 − 𝑖𝑙𝐿𝑣,𝑡+𝑛−1)          (𝑣 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑉 − 1) (79) 
where 
𝑃𝑃𝜐,𝑡+𝑛 =
𝐿𝑣,𝑡
𝑉−1
          (𝑛 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑉 − 1) (80) 
and 
𝐿𝜐,𝑡+𝑛−1 = 𝐿𝜐,𝑡+𝑛−2 − 𝑃𝑃𝑣,𝑡+𝑛−1          (𝑛 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑉 − 1) (81) 
The aggregate amount of principal payment at time t is then: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝜐,𝑡
𝑉−1
𝜐=1 =
𝑐𝑦𝑐Ω𝐾𝑡
𝑉
 (82) 
where, as in the two other essays: 
Ω =
1
𝑔(𝑉−1)
[1 − (1 + 𝑔)1−𝑉] (83) 
Finally, aggregating for the 𝑉 capitalists vintage at time 𝑡, substituting, reintroducing 𝜆𝑝 and 
adopting continuous time, it comes that: 
𝐶𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐(𝐹𝑓 − 𝛿𝐾) + (1 − 𝑐𝑐𝜆𝑝Ω)𝑐𝑦𝑐
𝐾
𝑉
 (84) 
?̇? = (1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω)𝑐𝑦𝑐
𝐾
𝑉
 (85) 
4.3. Equilibrium and dynamics analyses 
Taking account that workers consume their whole wages, the market goods equilibrium 
becomes: 
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𝑢∗ =
(1−𝑐𝑐𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑐
𝑉
+𝛾+(1−𝑐𝑐)𝛿
(1−𝑐𝑐)𝜋
 (86) 
where the major innovation is the absence of the debt ratio 𝜆. The change in the debt ratio is 
now: 
?̇? = (1 − 𝜆𝑝Ω)
𝑐𝑦𝑐
𝑉
− 𝜆𝛾 (87) 
which doesn’t include the rate of capacity utilization anymore, since the young capitalists 
borrowing depends on their wealth rather than their income. Consequently, as soon as 𝛾 > 0, 
the system converges without any ambiguity (𝑑?̇? 𝑑𝜆⁄ < −𝛾) towards its equilibrium which 
just depends on a few parameters: 
𝜆∗ =
(1−𝜆𝑝Ω)𝑐𝑦𝑐
𝛾𝑉
 (88) 
The debt ratio is then an increasing function of the propensity to borrow (𝑐𝑦𝑐) and a 
decreasing function of both 𝛾 and 𝜆𝑝. 
The main results of this third essay are threefold. First, the wealth effect (via the 𝑐𝑦𝑐 
parameter) has a positive impact on the rate of capacity utilization. Second, as the wealth 
effect is financed by borrowing, it involves an increase in the debt ratio. Finally, the rise in the 
debt ratio 𝜆 implies no feedback on the rate of capacity utilization. That stems from the fact 
that interests are paid as well as received by capitalists. In other words, contrary to the results 
in Bhaduri et al. (2006), consumer debt has no direct impact on economic activity if the debt 
is contracted between capitalists for the sake that it involves an income distribution between 
people whose consumption behaviors are identical. Nevertheless, there is an indirect impact 
under the assumption that borrowing is necessary for the wealth effect to be effective 
(capitalists don’t have to realize their virtual wealth to finance their consumption). 
The other comparative statistics results remain unchanged (see Table 10). Once again, note 
that both the rate of capacity utilization and the debt ratio are lower if principal is paid 
(𝜆𝑝 = 1) than if it is omitted (𝜆𝑝 = 0). 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this article is essentially methodological as it involves analyzing the properties of 
the equilibrium of Post Keynesian models including consumer debt and taking the principal 
payment into account through an overlapping generations framework. 
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As it has been shown, this innovation doesn’t deeply disrupt most of the conclusions of the 
models available in the existing literature. Our analysis thus confirms that an increase in the 
young workers propensity to borrow doesn’t necessarily imply a rise in the economic activity 
if workers borrow from capitalists (essay 1). To obtain this positive effect, the rate of 
accumulation must be higher than the rate of interest,
35
 a result which has been highlighted by 
Dutt (2006), Hein (2012), and Charpe and Flaschel (2013) among other. In addition, as for 
several authors, our analysis confirms that consumer debt isn’t destabilizing in itself (that is 
for a given value of every parameters) provided that the payment of interests corresponds to a 
discipline device on consumption: a higher debt generates higher interests then a fall of 
workers consumption that stabilizes the accumulation of debt. In other words, the system 
instability occurs in two cases: first, if the interests on debt servicing don’t play as a discipline 
device on workers consumption; second, if debt accumulation induces changes in some 
parameters such as the propensity to borrow (Hein, 2012; Charpe and Flaschel, 2013). 
If workers borrow from their peers (essay 2), as in Kim et al. (2014a), borrowing has a greater 
impact on economic activity if workers are assumed to consume a conventional fraction of 
their gross wage income whereas they regard saving as a luxury (scenario b). In such 
configuration however, the direction of the stream of funding is a matter of parameter: 
capitalists may contribute to the financing of the workers debt or, conversely, the workers 
saving may contribute to the financing of investment. 
Finally, if capitalists borrow from themselves (essay 3), borrowing can make it possible to 
consume out of wealth without the necessity to realize their virtual wealth. However, contrary 
to Bhaduri et al. (2006), we don’t find any other impact of debt on the level of economic 
activity because neither this debt nor its servicing involve some income distribution between 
agents with different consumption behaviors. 
However, introducing principal payment through an overlapping generations framework 
improves the analysis in many ways. First, it makes the models more consistent because, 
contrary to states, households can’t transform their loans in perpetual debt. Especially, the 
proof has been made that the intertemporal budget constraint (i.e. workers don’t consume 
more than their income during their lifetime is fully consistent with the result that workers 
(taken as an aggregate) consume more than their income at every period. The reason lies in 
economic growth that makes it possible for young workers to consume today a fraction of 
                                                 
35
 More exactly, assuming that capitalists have a positive propensity to consume, the rate of 
accumulation must be higher than the fraction of the interest rate that is devoted to capitalists saving. 
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their further, growing wages while older workers pay back the principal which is proportional 
with their previous, lower wages. 
Second, it makes easier the study of the consequences of defaults as they result from 
households who can’t pay back the principal to their creditor. It has been shown that defaults 
imply an income redistribution that has a positive impact on economic activity as it increases 
the disposable income of debtors and then their level of consumption. In addition, defaults 
don’t involve system instability in itself. These counterintuitive properties mean that the 
negative expected effect of defaults doesn’t results from their direct impact on economic 
activity but from an indirect impact: for instance, defaults deteriorate the state of confidence 
that induce either credit rationing or a continuous rise in the rate of interest. 
Third, as the increase in consumption resulting from young workers’ borrowing occurs to the 
detriment of their elders who have to service a higher debt, the proposal that consumer debt 
refers to the relative income hypothesis is questionable. As it had be claimed, the relative 
income hypothesis is more consistent with households increasing their lower than one 
propensity to consume than households increasing their propensity to borrow. 
Most importantly, introducing principal payment implies a fall in the multiplier effect (in the 
first two essays), hence a fall in the impact of an increase in the propensity to borrow on both 
the rate of capacity utilization and the debt ratio. The positive impact of consumer debt on 
economic activity is therefore overestimated in the models where the principal payment is 
omitted, which casts some doubts about the genuine impact of consumer debt. In addition, it 
had been shown that this reduced positive effect suffers from another fall when the economic 
rate of growth is low. In that case, the positive effect on consumption of the young workers’ 
borrowing is exactly offset by the negative effect resulting from their elders’ principal 
payment. 
In other words, the consumer debt impact on the long-run equilibrium is probably rather 
small. This is because of the negative effect of principal payment on the rate of capacity 
utilization. This is also because, in the long run, the debt ratio is stabilized at its equilibrium 
level. However, empirical data show a dramatic increase in consumer debt in many countries 
for a few decades. Such increase may result from the gradual but permanent shift in the value 
of an exogenous parameter: for instance, a year after year increase in the propensity to borrow 
stemming either from proactive banks behavior (and other supply-side factors), or from 
conspicuous consumption (and other demand-side factors). Such increase may also result 
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from debt unsustainability stemming from equilibrium instability: for instance, over-
indebtedness due to the destabilizing behavior of households having to borrow in order to 
service their debt. Whatever the reason, the rise in consumer debt corresponds to a situation in 
which the economic system isn’t at its long run equilibrium yet. This rise in consumer debt 
may have a greater impact on economic activity than what has been calculated at the long-run 
equilibrium. Indeed, if more households enter into debt every year, the positive impact of new 
loans keep one step ahead of the negative impact stemming from the ensuing principal 
payment, therefore a positive transitory impact on economic activity.
36
 However, the rise in 
consumer debt ought to reach a ceiling where the transitory impact vanishes, the long-run 
properties assert themselves, and economy is more vulnerable to a vicious circle of lending 
contraction.
37
 
The models presented in this article may be developed in at least three directions. First, as in 
Charpe and Flaschel (2013), the propensity to borrow should be made endogenous, relating to 
supply-side or demand-side factors of debt increase. Second, some simplifying hypothesis 
may be relaxed, as that of the exogenous rate of accumulation. Eventually, the analysis may 
be extended to the issue of housing debt, knowing that it would require distinguishing 
consumption goods from housing goods, the latter being durable and subject to transactions 
on the secondary market. 
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Appendix: Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Long-run equilibrium 
if the payment of interests plays as a discipline device on consumption 
 
 
Figure 2. Long-run equilibrium if the payment of interests 
doesn’t play as a discipline device on consumption: instability (case a) 
 
𝜆 
u 
?̇? = 0 
Φ[𝛾 + (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝛿] 
u* 
E 
𝛾 + (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝛿
(1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙
 
If 𝛾 > 0 
𝜆 
u 
?̇? = 0 
u* 
E 
A 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.87
 39 
Figure 3. Long-run equilibrium if the payment of interests 
doesn’t play as a discipline device on consumption: instability (case b) 
 
Nota : The horizontal arrows correspond to the convergence condition for a given rate of 
capacity utilization, that is: 𝑑?̇? 𝑑𝜆⁄ = −𝛾. However, the negative sign of this derivative 
(provided that 𝛾 is positive) doesn’t ensure that the whole system converges towards its 
equilibrium. In this case, the calculus of the derivative for and endogenous rate of capacity 
utilization is positive (since Ψ𝑖𝑙 > 𝛾), therefore the unstable equilibrium. 
 
Figure 4. Long-run equilibrium if the payment of interests 
doesn’t play as a discipline device on consumption: stability (case c) 
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Table 3. Capitalists finance the workers’ debt: 
short-run impact effects on 𝒖∗ assuming 𝜸 > 𝟎 
𝛾, 𝛿 +  
𝑐𝑐, 𝑐𝑦𝑤 +  
𝜋 –  
𝜆𝑖, 𝜆𝑝 –  
𝑖𝑙, 𝜆  
An increase in 𝜆𝑖 implies a decrease both in 𝑑𝑢
∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑙⁄  and in 𝑑𝑢
∗ 𝑑𝜆⁄  
     𝜆𝑖 = 0      𝑑𝑢
∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑙⁄ > 0 and 𝑑𝑢
∗ 𝑑𝜆⁄ > 0 
     𝜆𝑖 = 1      𝑑𝑢
∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑙⁄ < 0 and 𝑑𝑢
∗ 𝑑𝜆⁄ < 0 
𝑉 –  
𝜃 +  
 
 
Table 4. Capitalists finance the workers’ debt: 
long-run impact effects assuming 𝜸 > 𝟎, 𝝀𝒊 = 𝟏 and 𝜽 = 𝟎 
Positive 
shock on 
?̇? = 0 𝑢∗ Impact on 
Slope Intercept Slope 𝑢 𝜆 
𝛾 ↑ ↑ 0 + ? 
𝛿 0 ↑ 0 + + 
𝑖𝑙 0 0 ↓  – 
𝑐𝑦𝑤 ↓ ↑ ↓ 
+ if 𝛾 > (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙 
 if 𝛾 < (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙 
+ 
𝑐𝑐 0 ↑ ↓ + + 
𝜋 ↑ ↓ ↑ 
 if 𝛾 > (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙 
? if 𝛾 < (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙 
– 
𝜆𝑝, 𝑉 ↑ ↓ ↑ 
 if 𝛾 > (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙 
+ if 𝛾 < (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙 
– 
 
 
 
Table 5. Capitalists finance the workers’ debt: 
long-run impact effects assuming 𝜸 > 𝟎, 𝝀𝒊 = 𝝀𝒑 = 𝟏 and 𝜽 > 𝟎 
Positive 
shock on 
?̇? = 0 𝑢∗ Impact on 
Slope Intercept Slope 𝑢 𝜆 
𝜃 0 ↑ ↓ + + 
𝑐𝑦𝑤 ↓ ↑ ↓ 
+ if 𝛾 > (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙 
? if 𝛾 < (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑙 
+ 
The other results of Table 4 remain unchanged. 
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Table 10. Capitalists finance their own debt: comparative statistics 
Positive 
shock on 
Impact on 
𝑢 𝜆 
𝛾 + – 
𝛿, 𝑐𝑐 + 0 
𝜆 (a) 0 not relevant 
𝑖𝑙 0 0 
𝑐𝑦𝑐 + + 
𝑐𝑐 + 0 
𝜆𝑝, 𝑉  – 
(a)
 Only concerns the short-run impact of an 
exogenous shift in the debt ratio (𝜆) on the rate of 
capacity utilization (𝑢). 
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